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Defense Cooperation: A Theoretical Understanding
Bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs) have become 
the most common form of institutionalized defense cooperation. 
These formal agreements establish broad defense-oriented legal 
frameworks between signatories, facilitating cooperation in 
fundamental areas such as defense policy coordination, research 
and development, joint military exercises, education and training, 
arms procurement, and exchange of classified information.1 Nearly 
a thousand DCAs are currently in force, with potentially wide-
ranging impacts on national and international security outcomes. A 
theory that integrates cooperation theory with insights from social 
network analysis explains the significance and need for DCAs.2 
Shifts in the global security environment since the 1980s fueled the 
demand for DCAs. Ever since, States are known to have used DCAs 
to modernize their militaries, respond to shared security threats, and 
establish security umbrellas with like-minded states. However, the 
DCA proliferation cannot be attributed to the demand factor alone. 
Nations are required also to overcome dilemmas of mistrust and 
distributional conflicts.3 Network influences can increase the supply 
of DCAs by providing governments with information about the 
trustworthiness of partners and the risk of asymmetric distributions 
of gains. Two specific network influences that can be identified 
here are—preferential attachment and triadic closure. They show 
that these influences are largely responsible for the post-Cold War 
1　 Brandon J Kinne, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a 
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diffusion of DCAs.4 Novel empirical strategies 
further indicate that these influences derive 
from the proposed informational mechanism. 
States use the DCA ties of others to glean 
information about prospective defense partners, 
thus endogenously fueling further growth of the 
global DCA network.5 
In order to develop a comprehensive theory 
of DCA formation, the cooperation theor y 
with network-analytic insights need to be 
synthesized.6 States cooperate in order to obtain 
joint gains.7 Exogenous macro-level shifts in the 
global security environment increased the joint 
gains of defense cooperation and thus increased 
the demand for DCAs. These systemwide 
trends translate into specific dyadic influences. 
Faced with an increasingly complex security 
environment, states use DCAs8 to:
• Modernize their militaries and improve their 
defense capacities
• Improve coordinated responses to common 
security threats, and
• Align themselves with communities of like-
minded collaborators
At the dyadic level,  demand for DCAs 
depends on whether potential par tners can 
help one another at meeting these goals. 
When governments create DCAs, they reveal 
information about their trustworthiness and 
their preferred institutional designs. DCAs 
4　Ibid.
5　Ibid.
6　 For more details see on the subject see, James D. Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” 
International Organization, vol. 52, no. 2, 1998, pp. 269‒305; also see, Mark E.J. Newman, “The Structure and 
Function of Complex Networks,” SIAM Review, vol. 45, no. 2, 2003, pp. 167‒256; and see, Arthur A. Stein, 
“Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2,  1982, 
pp. 299‒324, as cited in Kinne, n. 1
7　 For additional reading see, Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” World 
Politics, vol. 37, no. 1, 1984, pp. 1‒23.
8　Kinne, n. 1.
9　Ibid., p. 802.
10　 For further details see, Danielle F. Jung, and David A. Lake, “Markets, Hierarchies, and Networks: An Agent-Based 
Organizational Ecology,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 55, no. 4, 2011, pp. 972‒90.
involve network influence—i.e., relations 
between one pair of states af fect relations 
between others. Two specific types of network 
influence: preferential attachment ,  where 
highly active states or “hubs” in the network 
endogenously attract new partners, and triadic 
closure, where states that share DCA ties with 
the same third parties or “friends of friends” 
are more likely to cooperate directly.9 These 
network influences are empirically observable 
reflections of the underlying informational value 
of the ties of others. 10 
Whi le  network in f luences  have been 
documented previously in inter nat ional 
relations,11 Brendon Kinne extends those 
insights by focusing more directly on causal 
mechanisms and argues that the influence of 
triadic closure and preferential attachment 
varies according to the quality of governments’ 
informational environment, which strongly 
suggests that network influences indeed depend 
on an informational mechanism. Mostly, the 
empirical analysis indicates that, post-Cold War, 
network influences quickly became the driving 
force behind DCA proliferation. Out-of-sample 
predictions show that although exogenous 
dyadic factors and corresponding shifts in the 
global security environment were important 
determinants of defense cooperation, network 
influences dramatically improve our ability to 
predict who signs DCAs, and when. Exogenous 







influences ensure supply.12 DCAs emphasize 
day-to-day interactions in core defense areas, 
which typically include:
a)　 mutual consultation and defense policy 
coordination
b)　joint exercises, training, and education
c)　coordination in peacekeeping operations
d)　 defense-related research and development
e)　defense industrial cooperation
f )　weapons procurement; and
g)　security of classified information
The primar y goal of DCAs, then, is to 
encourage substantive cooperation in the above 
core areas.13 
The First India & Japan 2+2 Foreign & 
Defense Ministerial Set up
J a p a n e s e  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s  M i n i s t e r 
Toshimitsu Motegi and Minister of Defense 
Taro Kono visited India to attend the inaugural 
meeting of India-Japan Foreign and Defense 
Ministerial Dialogue (2+2) on November 30, 
2019. Upon their calling on the Indian Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi, the latter expressed 
his satisfaction at the two sides being able to 
accomplish this goal set by him and Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe during the 13th India-
Japan Annual Summit held in Japan in October 
2018. The India-Japan Foreign and Defense 
11　 For example, Skyler J. Cranmer, Bruce A. Desmarais, and Justin H. Kirkland, “Toward a Network Theory of Alliance 
Formation,” International Interactions, vol. 38, no. 3, 2012, pp. 295‒324; also see, Brandon J. Kinne, “Network 
Dynamics and the Evolution of International Cooperation,” American Political Science Review, vol. 107, no. 4, 
2013, pp. 766‒85; and see, Mark S. Manger, Mark A. Pickup, and Tom A.B. Snijders, “A Hierarchy of Preferences: 
A Longitudinal Network Analysis Approach to PTA Formation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 56, no. 5, 
2012, pp. 853‒78; also see, Zeev Maoz, “Preferential Attachment, Homophily, and the Structure of International 
Networks, 1816‒2003,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, vol.  29, no. 3, 2012, pp. 341‒69; and see, 
Michael D. Ward, John S. Ahlquist, and Arturas Rozenas, “Gravity’s Rainbow: A Dynamic Latent Space Model for the 
World Trade Network,” Network Science, vol. 1, no. 1, 2013, pp. 95‒118; and see, Camber Warren, “The Geometry 
of Security: Modeling Interstate Alliances as Evolving Networks,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 47, no. 6, 2010, 
pp. 697‒709.
12　Kinne, n. 1, p. 802.
13　Ibid.
14　 For more details see, Joint Statement: First India-Japan 2+2 Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, Indian 
Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, November 30, 2019.
Ministerial Dialogue (2+2) is expected to 
further deepen bilateral strategic, security and 
defense cooperation between India and Japan. 
The importance of all-round development in 
India-Japan relations requires for regular high-
level exchanges between the two countries. 
Prime Minister Modi also mentioned that Prime 
Minister Abe and he attach great importance to 
strengthen the bilateral partnership between the 
two countries. India’s relationship with Japan 
is a key component of New Delhi’s vision for 
peace, stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific 
region, as well as a cornerstone of India’s Act 
East Policy. 14 
At the commencement of the first India-Japan 
2+2 Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, 
the Defense Minister of India, Rajnath Singh and 
External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, along 
with their Japanese counterparts Toshimitsu 
Motegi and Taro Kono af firmed that this 
dialogue will further enhance the strategic depth 
of bilateral security and defense cooperation. 
Held on November 30, 2019 in New Delhi 
for the first time, the meeting acknowledged 
the emerging security challenges, and their 
commitment to advancing bilateral security 
cooperation based on the 2008 Joint Declaration 
on Security Cooperation, and, 2009 Action Plan 
to advance Security Cooperation. India and Japan 
hold a shared vision of a free, open, inclusive 





the principles of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity are ensured, and all countries enjoy 
freedom of navigation and overflight. Further, 
strengthening of bilateral cooperation is in 
mutual interest of both countries that shall 
concurrently help in furthering the cause of 
peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific 
region.15 The second India-Japan 2+2 Foreign 
and Defense Ministerial Meeting is slated to be 
held in Tokyo.
Indo-Japan Bilateral Defense Cooperation
India and Japan have made considerable 
progress in deepening bilateral  defense 
cooperation since 2018 by initiating bilateral 
exercises between all three components of 
their defense forces. These bilateral exercises 
between the defense forces shall be held 
regularly and further expanded, especially the 
more recent Dharma Guardian-2019 and the 
second Shinyuu Maitri-2019. Tokyo and New 
Delhi shall also proceed with coordination for 
the first India-Japan joint fighter aircraft exercise 
in Japan. Additionally, there is significant 
progress made in the negotiations of Acquisition 
and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) since 
the announcement to commence negotiations 
was made in October 2018. It is desirable for 
both nations for an early conclusion of the 
negotiations since the agreement will further 
contribute to enhancing bilateral defense 
cooperation. 16 
It would not be inappropriate to state that 
DCAs have evolved as a novel form of defense 
cooperation. At their core, these agreements 
establish long-term institutional frameworks 
for routine bilateral defense relations, including 
coordination of defense policies, joint military 
exercises, working groups and committees, 
15　Ibid.
16　Ibid.
17　Kinne, n. 1, p. 800.
18　Ibid.
19　As cited in Dinakar Peri, “India Starts Sharing Maritime Data,” The Hindu, October 6, 2019.
training and educational exchanges, defense-
related research and development ,  and 
procurement. As frameworks, DCAs reserve 
specific details of implementation for protocols 
and implementing legislation.17 The flexibility 
implies that DCAs can both improve traditional 
defense capabilities and address protean non-
traditional threats as terrorism, traf ficking, 
piracy, and cyber security. Importantly, DCAs 
are not alliances. And unlike the forms of 
defense cooperation that dominated great-
power politics during the Cold War, DCAs are 
typically highly symmetric, mutually committing 
signatories to a common set of guidelines.18 
In this reference specifically, maritime safety 
and security and safety is an area of major 
focus. Ensuring maritime safety in achieving 
a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-
Pacific is a long-term goal for both Japan and 
India. Promoting cooperation in the field of 
capacity-building in maritime security and 
Maritime Domain Awareness including through 
cooperation with other countries figures on the 
charter for future defense cooperation.
Arguing contextually in the above regard, 
setting up of an Information Fusion Centre 
– Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) at the 
Information Management and Analysis Centre 
(IMAC) facility in Gurugram, by India, in 
December 2018 is a welcome initiative. The 
IMAC facility is the single point center linking 
all the coastal radar chains to generate a 
seamless real-time picture of the nearly 7,500-
km coastline. The IFC-IOR serves as the nodal 
center for promoting collaborative maritime 
safety and security towards a peaceful, stable 
and prosperous Indian Ocean Region.19 The 
objective is to enhance maritime domain 
awareness and coordinate activities through 







development along with partner nations and 
agencies. By means of this framework, partner 
nations and multi-national maritime constructs 
will engage to develop comprehensive maritime 
domain awareness and share information 
on vessels of interest. The intention of this 
collaborative endeavor shall be to secure the 
global commons. 20
While the information exchange at the IFC-
IOR would be undertaken initially by vir tual 
means, using telephone calls, faxes, e-mails and 
video conferencing over internet, subsequently, 
to enable better interaction, and quicker analysis 
of information to provide timely inputs, the IFC-
IOR would host Liaison Officers from partner 
countries. For the same, India is also looking 
for ward to the dispatch of a liaison of ficer 
from Japan at the IFC-IOR in the near future. 
Additionally, towards enhancing capability 
building, the IFC-IOR would undertake conduct 
of exercises and training capsules in maritime 
information collation and sharing.21 The IFC 
tracks and monitors 75,000 – 1.5 lakh shipping 
vessels in real time round-the-clock. Besides, the 
IFC is also actively interacting with the maritime 
community and has already built linkages with 
18 countries and 15 multinational and maritime 
security centers.22
Moreover, the exchange of information based 
on the Implementing Arrangement for Deeper 
Cooperation between the Japan Maritime Self-
Defense Force and the Indian Navy signed 
in 2018 has already commenced.23 India and 
20　 “Raksha Mantri Inaugurates Information Fusion Centre ‒ Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR),” Press Release, Press 
Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Defense, December 22, 2018.
21　Ibid.
22　The Hindu, n. 19.
23　India-Japan Joint Statement, n. 14.
24　 Andrew H. Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005; 
also see, Duncan Snidal, “Coordination Versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and 
Regimes,” The American Political Science Review, vol. 79, no. 4, 1985, pp. 923‒42.
25　 James D. Morrow, “Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information,” 
International Organization, vol. 48, no. 3, 1994, pp. 387‒87, as cited in Kinne, n. 1.
26　Kinee, n. 1, p. 802.
Japan find agreement upon the need to further 
strengthen defense equipment and technology 
cooperation and need to work productively 
on discussions during the fifth Joint Working 
Group on Defense Equipment and Technology 
Cooperation (JWG-DETC). In this context, the 
progress on cooperative research in the area of 
Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV)/Robotics is 
welcome.
Joint gains, however, are just one aspect of the 
story when it comes to understanding defense 
cooperation agreements generically. Even when 
the demand for cooperation is high, information 
asymmetries may limit the supply of cooperative 
ins t i tu t ions .  S ta tes  o f ten  lack  cr edib le 
information about one another’s willingness to 
cooperate.24 Because DCAs involve sensitive 
national security issues, including access to 
classified information, coordination of defense 
policies, and proliferation of sophisticated 
weapons technologies, they inherently involve 
issues pertaining trust. States further may lack 
information about one another’s institutional 
design preferences, such as the preferred scope 
and precision of formal agreements, which leads 
to distributional conflicts. 25 
The Constructivist Concept, Identity, 
Norms, and Interaction in Foreign Policy
In the case of states that are unsure of the 
others’ trustworthiness or unsure about the 
types of agreements others are willing to sign, 





of India and Japan stands divergent to this 
submission. Foreign policy decision-making is 
an outcome of how individual political leaders 
bestowed with power perceive and analyze 
events and how their motivations hold a bearing 
upon the conclusions they ultimately arrive 
upon. It is often found that culture, geography, 
history, ideology, and self-conceptions shape the 
thought process of a decision maker, forming, 
what often is referred to as the psycho-socio 
milieu of decision-making.27 
Based on the constructivist concept, wherein 
identity, norms, and interaction of personalities 
remain vital components, the equation between 
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and 
his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe speaks 
volumes. The commonality of aiming towards 
economic development and growth that gets 
coupled with greater national strength and 
nationalism can be gauged from Abe’s idea 
and policy of “Japan is back” and Modi’s idea 
of “Shreshtha Bharat” (Superior India).28 The 
systemic conditions have presented a favorable 
platform for this duo to bring to light, “…dawn 
of a new era in India-Japan relations”. Moreover, 
as PM Modi stated on an occasion “…[The] 
India-Japan partnership has been fundamentally 
transformed and has been strengthened as 
a ‘special strategic and global partnership’… 
There are no negatives but only opportunities in 
this relationship which are waiting to be seized.” 29 
Providing further credence to this thought, 
Modi underlined the significance of India 
and Japan being liberal democracies, which 
27　 For more details see, Harold Hance Sprout, et al., The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs, With Special 
Reference to International Politics, Princeton Center of International Studies, January 1965.
28　 For further reading on the subject see, Monika Chansoria, “India-Japan Relations under Modi and Abe: Prospects 
and Challenges for a Novel Bilateral Asian Dynamic,” India Foundation Journal, vol. 7, no. 3, May-June 2019.
29　Ibid.
30　Ibid.
provides them with a solid foundation to 
converge at various levels on the Asian stage. 
With a shared perspective on the future geo-
political and economic order of Asia, Modi 
and Abe are often viewed as leaders of a new 
prospective dawn of an alternative regional 
Asian dynamic. Personality impact in foreign 
policy decision-making may not necessarily 
be exclusive. It hinges on cognitive processes 
including perceptive reasoning that defines the 
behavior of nation-states based upon existential 
constraints of the international system as well 
as compulsions of domestic political structures. 
Modi’s assurances to Japanese investors that a 
“red carpet” and not “red tape” would welcome 
them in India exhibited his intent and resolve to 
rewrite the rules of doing business in India. In 
fact, it is the flexibility in the political environs 
that tends to create variable boundaries in 
decision-making, more so, in the realm of 
foreign policy. These systemic conditions have 
presented a favorable platform for Modi and Abe 
to envision and operationalize what has been 
termed as “...the dawn of a new era in India-
Japan relations.” 30 
Foundations of Multilateralism
While  mult i la tera l  organizat ions and 
practices have been examined empirically, their 
sources have not been the subject of much 
concern in realist and neorealist theor y. An 
important debate in international relations is 
taking place between proponents of rationalist 
theory, which is exemplified by neorealism, and 







institutionalism.31 Both groups are interested 
in explaining the sociality of states – that is, 
the manner in which states acknowledge 
membership in and contribute to international 
society. Neorealists theoretically demonstrate 
that cooperative behavior among many players 
can emerge as a result of self- interested 
strategic interactions and can do so within a 
class of games that is itself non-cooperative in 
its paucity of communications, trust, and third-
party enforcement.32 This is not a project that is 
doomed to failure.33 Examining theories of public 
goods can help see if the scope of externalities 
might provide insight into the question of the 
generality of cooperation.34 
T h e r e  a r e  l i m i t a t i o n s  t o  n e o r e a l i s t 
approaches, however. Neorealism under-
estimates the extent to which cooperation 
depends on a prior set of unacknowledged 
claims about the embeddedness of cooperative 
habits, shared values, and taken-for-granted 
rules. Further, its assumption that preferences 
are exogenously given reduces multilateralism 
to a question of strategic interaction, making 
it dif ficult to comprehend multilateralism 
propelled by collective beliefs, presumptive 
habits, and shared values.35 Finally, the absence 
of a historical (narrative) approach discourages 
the exploration of counterfactuals and lends 
support to the view that arrangements, including 
institutional ar rangements, are what they 
31　 For further reading see, Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” International Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 32, December 1988, pp. 379-96; and specifically see, James A. Caporaso, “International Relations 
Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations,” International Organization, vol. 46, no. 3, Summer, 1992, 
p. 630
32　Caporaso, n. 31.
33　 See Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and see, 
Rudolph Schuessler, “Exit Threats and Cooperation Under Anonymity,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 33, 
December 1989, pp. 728-49.
34　 Further see, Todd Sandler and John T. Tschirhart, “The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey,” Journal 
of Economic Literature, vol. 18, December 1980, pp. 1481-1521.
35　Caporaso, n. 31, pp. 630-631.
36　Ibid.
37　 For details see, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., “Rescuing ‘Reason’ from the ‘Rationalists’: Reading Vico, Marx, and Weber as 
Reflective Institutionalists,” Mimeograph, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 1990, p. 10.
are either because they represent functional 
responses to environmental challenges or 
because they reflect the prevailing power 
distribution.36 
Reflectivists reject the state of nature as the 
appropriate starting point even for heuristic 
purposes. If states are characterized only by 
interests and strategies, cooperative outcomes 
will not occur. Shared understandings regarding 
the rules of the game, the nature of permissible 
plays, the linkages between choices and 
outcomes, and the nature of agents involved 
in the game are impor tant preconditions. 
To say this is to acknowledge that shared 
understandings and communicative rationality 
are as important as instrumental rationality.37 
Instead of deriving sociality from the state of 
nature, the task of reflectionists is to show how 
socially defined states, operating within given 
institutional sites, engage in behavior that is 
both competitive and cooperative.
W h i l e  a n  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a p p r o a c h  t o 
multilateralism should not banish individuals, 
intentional behavior, and strategic interaction, 
it highlights dif ferent things. It might try to 
understand the emergence of multilateralism 
as a product of the power, resources, and 
beliefs of important actors and the reproduction 
o f  mul t i l a tera l  ins t i tu t ions  in  ter ms o f 





norms, and adaptation to the “needs of the 
institution.” 38 
Indo-Japan Multilateral Cooperative 
Initiatives
In the realm of multilateral cooperation, 
the Japan-India-US Summit Meetings in 
November 2018 and June 2019 have become a 
major benchmark of the strong and continuing 
foundational trilateral cooperation. More 
recently, the trilateral has been represented by:
• MALABAR 2019  held from September-
October 2019 off the coast of Japan
• Mine-countermeasures exercise (MINEX) 
held in Japan in July 2019
• Cope India 2018 in which Japan participated as 
an observer in December 2018
In the field of regional and international 
affairs, India and Japan find agreement in their 
views on supporting ASEAN centrality and unity 
for promoting peace and prosperity of the Indo-
Pacific as par t of which, came the adoption 
of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific 
(AOIP) during the 34th ASEAN Summit held in 
Thailand in June 2019. Tokyo and New Delhi 
are committed to working together with ASEAN 
for achieving their shared objectives, and also 
reiterating their support for various ASEAN-led 
frameworks such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN 
Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus).
At the 14th EAS, India announced an “Indo-
Pacific Oceans Initiative” to create a safe, 
secure, stable, prosperous and sustainable 
maritime domain – a declaration that was 
welcomed by Japan as both confirmed to discuss 
concrete cooperation based on the initiative. 
On similar lines, India has welcomed Japan’s 
“Vientiane Vision 2.0” in November 2019. This 
38　Caporaso, n. 31, p. 633.
39　 For details see, “Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN,” Japan’s Ministry of Defense, 
November 2019, available at https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/exc/admm/06/vv2_en.pdf
vision finds overlapping and harmoniously 
congruent themes of ASEAN principles such as 
openness, transparency, inclusivity and a rules-
based framework, which have been outlined 
in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, with 
those featuring in Japan’s own vision for a Free 
and Open Indo-Pacific. The 2.0 framework is 
an updated version of the initiative for defense 
cooperation between Japan and ASEAN that 
revisits Japan’s past three years’ endeavors on 
defense cooperation with ASEAN as per the 
Vientiane Vision announced in 2016.
The 2.0 version redefines the vision in 
l ine with the concept of the Indo-Pacific 
and presents three principles for Japanese 
defense cooperation with ASEAN, including 
enhancement of resilience as one of the ends. 
As part of a concerted whole of government 
effort, Japan’s Ministry of Defense will conduct 
practical cooperation by combining the following 
measures.39
• P r o m o t i n g  S h a r e d  U n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f 
International Norms – sharing knowledge on 
international norms and practices
• Defense Cooperation Program – assisting 
ASEAN’s proactive ef for ts for enhancing 
its collective capabilities by sending JSDF 
personnel to Southeast Asia and inviting 
ASEAN practitioners to Japan
• Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation 
– transferring equipment and technology, 
developing human resources, etc.
• Joint Training and Exercises – conducting 
bilateral and multilateral joint exercises, 
expanding forms of participation and inviting 
ASEAN observers to JSDF training
• Human Resource Development and Academic 
Exchanges – reinforcing human networks 
among students and trainees, etc.







the South China Sea and keeping in view the 
Chairman’s Statement during the 14th EAS, 
India and Japan have placed prime focus on 
the importance of freedom of navigation and 
overflight, unimpeded lawful commerce and 
peaceful resolution of disputes with full respect 
for legal and diplomatic processes in accordance 
with the universally recognized principles of 
international law, including those reflected in 
the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS). The negotiations of a 
Code of Conduct (COC) should be taken note 
of and should be ef fective, substantive, and 
consistent with international law, including the 
UNCLOS, ensure freedom of navigation and 
must not prejudice the rights and interests of 
the stakeholders using the South China Sea and 
freedoms of all states under international law.
During the 8th round of the India-Japan 
Bilateral Consultations on Disarmament, Non-
Proliferation and Export Control held in Tokyo 
on December 23, 2019, both nations reiterated 
the importance of dialogue as an important 
mechanism between the two countries. While 
the Indian delegation was led by Indra Mani 
Pandey, Additional Secretary (Disarmament 
and International Security Af fairs), Ministry 
of External Af fairs, the Japanese delegation 
was led by Hisajima Naoto, Director-General, 
Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science 
Depar tment, Ministr y of Foreign Af fairs.40 
Similarly, during the 5th round of the India-Japan 
Maritime Af fairs Dialogue held in Tokyo on 
December 24, 2019, the underlying theme of 
further strengthening maritime cooperation was 
reiterated.
Conclusion
The  cons t r uc t i v i s t  concep t  v i s - à - v i s 
interaction of personalities is a defining factor 
that will likely shape the current and future 
trajectory of India-Japan relations. Since Abe 
40　 Press Release, 8th Round of India-Japan Bilateral Consultations on Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Export 
Control, Indian Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, December 26, 2019.
and Modi share similar perspectives on Asia’s 
future geo-political and economic order, they 
should not let go of the solid foundation and 
convergences at the strategic level for greater 
leverage and say in the future security design 
of Asia. The time has come to make flexible, 
the variable boundaries in decision-making that 
political environs tend to create in the realm of 
foreign policy and achieve strategic deliverables 
in the coming years, without allowing any 
external third factor to cast a shadow on the 
meteoric rise in Indo-Japanese ties. The Modi-
Abe leadership combine exhibits showmanship, 
content, and cognitive consistency by means of 
converging themes of nationalism, coupled with 
motivated eagerness to initiate action driven 
towards ushering in an era of policy-oriented 
change, domestically, bilaterally, and regionally.
